Agent-to-Agent Security Validation Checklist¶

For Non-Technical Security Professionals¶

Version: 1.0
Last Updated: December 2025
Purpose: Guide cross-functional conversations between Security, Architects, and Developers for AI Agent deployments

How to Use This Checklist¶

This checklist is designed for: - Design reviews of new agent systems - Security assessments of existing deployments - Pre-deployment validation before production release - Audit preparation for compliance requirements - Incident investigation to identify security gaps

Workflow: 1. Start with Pre-Implementation Phase before any code is written 2. Work through Implementation Phase during development 3. Complete Post-Implementation Phase before and after deployment 4. Review Ongoing Operations quarterly

Scoring: - ✅ Fully implemented and verified - ⚠️ Partially implemented or needs improvement - ❌ Not implemented or significant gaps - N/A Not applicable to this deployment

Goal: All items should be ✅ before production deployment of critical agents

Pre-Implementation Phase¶

Architecture & Design Review¶

Communication Flow Documentation¶

All agent-to-agent communication paths documented
Network topology diagram showing all agents created
Sequence diagrams for critical workflows available
Data flow diagrams showing what information moves where
Documentation of which agents can initiate communication with others
External dependencies (databases, APIs, third-party services) identified
Synchronous vs. asynchronous communication patterns documented
Fallback mechanisms and error handling paths defined

Questions to Ask: - "Can you walk me through how agents communicate with each other?" - "What happens if communication between Agent A and Agent B is blocked?" - "Are there any undocumented 'debug' or 'admin' communication paths?"

Red Flags: - 🚩 Phrases like "agents can talk to any other agent" - 🚩 Undocumented communication paths - 🚩 Assumptions that "agents are on our network so they're trusted"

Trust Level Assessment¶

Trust level defined for each agent-to-agent communication
Full trust, partial trust, or zero trust explicitly identified
Justification documented for each trust level
Trust assumptions challenged (not defaulting to "internal = trusted")
Impact assessment: "If Agent A is compromised, what happens to Agent B?"
Different security policies for different trust levels defined

Trust Level Matrix:

Agent A	Agent B	Trust Level	Justification	Security Controls
_______	_______	Full/Partial/Zero	____________	_________________

Questions to Ask: - "Why should these agents trust each other?" - "What happens if one agent is compromised?" - "Should these agents trust each other's data without verification?"

Red Flags: - 🚩 Everything labeled "full trust" without justification - 🚩 No consideration of compromised agent scenarios - 🚩 Same security controls for all communications regardless of trust level

Trust Boundary Identification¶

All trust boundaries in agent architecture identified
Internal vs. external boundaries mapped
Security zone boundaries (DMZ, internal, external) documented
Data classification boundaries identified
Privilege level boundaries mapped
Communication paths crossing boundaries highlighted
Additional controls for boundary crossings defined

Trust Boundary Matrix:

Communication Path	Crosses Boundary?	Boundary Type	Additional Controls Required
_________________	Yes/No	_____________	____________________________

Boundary Types: - Internal ↔ External - Different VPCs or security groups - Public data ↔ Confidential data - User-level ↔ Admin-level privileges

Questions to Ask: - "Where do our security zones begin and end?" - "Which communications cross from one trust zone to another?" - "What controls protect these boundaries?"

Red Flags: - 🚩 No clear boundaries between customer-controlled and organization-controlled agents - 🚩 Same authentication for all communications regardless of boundary - 🚩 "It's all internal so we don't need encryption"

Operations Criticality Assessment¶

Business impact assessed for each agent's operations
Financial impact evaluated (max exposure per operation)
Data sensitivity determined (PII, PHI, financial, trade secrets)
Availability requirements defined (uptime SLAs)
Compliance requirements identified (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOX)
Cascading impact analyzed (what else fails if this agent fails?)
Criticality rating assigned (Critical, High, Medium, Low)

Criticality Matrix:

Agent	Operations	Financial Impact	Data Sensitivity	Uptime Required	Compliance	Criticality
_____	__________	$______________	________________	___________%	__________	___________

Criticality-Based Controls: - CRITICAL: All 8 layers mandatory + real-time monitoring + incident response + regular pentesting - HIGH: All 8 layers strongly recommended + monitoring + incident response - MEDIUM: Core controls + basic monitoring - LOW: Standard controls + logging

Questions to Ask: - "What's the worst-case scenario if this agent performs an unauthorized operation?" - "How quickly must we detect and respond to a compromised agent?" - "What compliance attestations or audits cover these operations?"

Red Flags: - 🚩 "This is just a prototype" for agents handling production data - 🚩 No clear owner who can articulate business impact - 🚩 Assumption that low-frequency operations are automatically low-criticality

Data Classification and Message Sensitivity¶

Data classification scheme applied to all messages
Message types inventoried with data elements listed
Highest classification level identified for each message type
Regulatory requirements for each data type documented (GDPR, CCPA, HIPAA, PCI-DSS)
Encryption requirements determined (TLS only vs. field-level encryption)
Retention policies defined based on classification
Access control policies aligned with data classification

Message Classification Inventory:

Message Type	Data Elements	Classification	Regulatory Req	Encryption	Retention
____________	_____________	______________	______________	__________	_________

Classification Levels: - Public: No confidentiality requirement - Internal: For internal use only - Confidential: Significant impact if disclosed - Restricted: Severe impact, regulated data

Questions to Ask: - "What data is included in each message payload?" - "Are message payloads encrypted beyond transport encryption?" - "Are logs properly sanitized to avoid exposing sensitive data?" - "Do non-production environments receive production data?"

Red Flags: - 🚩 Developers uncertain about what data their agents exchange - 🚩 No data classification policy or unfamiliarity with it - 🚩 PII or credentials appearing in log files - 🚩 Same handling for all messages regardless of content

Threat Modeling¶

Compromised Agent Scenarios¶

Impact analysis completed for each agent type being compromised
Direct impact identified (what compromised agent can do immediately)
Lateral movement potential assessed (which other agents can be reached)
Data exposure evaluated (what data can be exfiltrated)
Blast radius documented (maximum scope of compromise)
Mitigation strategies defined (network segmentation, least privilege, monitoring)

Compromise Impact Matrix:

Agent	Direct Impact	Lateral Movement	Data Exposure	Blast Radius	Mitigations
_____	_____________	________________	_____________	____________	___________

Questions to Ask: - "Assume Agent X is fully compromised. What can an attacker do?" - "Which other agents can be compromised from this position?" - "Can we detect if this agent is behaving abnormally?" - "How quickly can we isolate a compromised agent?"

Attack Vector Analysis¶

Session hijacking impact assessed
Credential theft scenarios evaluated
Replay attack potential analyzed
Man-in-the-middle attack vectors identified
Privilege escalation paths mapped
Denial of service risks evaluated
Detection mechanisms for each attack vector defined

Attack Scenario Checklist:

What happens if session tokens are stolen?
What happens if communications are intercepted?
What happens if valid messages are replayed?
What happens if credentials are brute-forced?
What privilege escalation paths exist?
How would we detect each type of attack?

Residual Risk Documentation¶

All identified risks documented
Mitigations mapped to each risk
Residual risks (after mitigations) identified
Risk acceptance decisions documented with business justification
Risk owners assigned
Risk review schedule established

Implementation Phase¶

Layer 1: Transport Security¶

TLS Configuration¶

TLS 1.3 (or newer) enforced for all agent-to-agent communications
TLS 1.2 and older versions rejected/disabled
Weak cipher suites disabled
Strong cipher suites configured (TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
Certificate validation properly implemented
Certificate chain verified to trusted root CA
Certificate expiration checking enabled
Certificate hostname validation enabled
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or OCSP checking configured

Testing:

# Verify TLS 1.3 enforcement
openssl s_client -connect agent-endpoint:443 -tls1_3

# Verify cipher suites
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 agent-endpoint

Questions to Ask: - "Is TLS 1.3 mandatory for all agent communications?" - "Are weak ciphers (RC4, DES, 3DES) disabled?" - "How are certificates managed and renewed?"

Mutual TLS (mTLS) - If Required¶

Requirement for mTLS determined based on trust boundaries
Client certificates issued to all agents
Certificate-based agent identity verification implemented
Certificate pinning configured (if applicable)
Client certificate validation enforced server-side

mTLS Required When: - Communications cross trust boundaries (internal ↔ external) - Zero-trust architecture mandated - Regulatory compliance requires strong authentication - Cryptographic agent identity verification needed

Certificate Management¶

Certificate expiration monitoring configured
Alerts set for 30, 14, and 7 days before expiration
Automated certificate renewal implemented (Let's Encrypt, cert-manager, etc.)
Emergency certificate replacement procedure documented
Certificate revocation process defined
Certificate inventory maintained

Layer 2: Authentication¶

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)¶

MFA implemented for all agent authentication
MFA mechanism selected and tested (TOTP, hardware tokens, certificates)
MFA bypass scenarios identified and secured (emergency access)
MFA secrets securely stored and rotated

Acceptable MFA Methods: - ✅ TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password) - ✅ Hardware tokens (YubiKey, security keys) - ✅ Certificate-based (client certificates in mTLS) - ❌ SMS codes (vulnerable to SIM swapping) - ❌ Email codes (email compromise common) - ❌ Security questions (easily researched)

Enterprise Identity Provider (IdP) Integration¶

Enterprise IdP selected (Auth0, Okta, Azure AD, Google Identity)
IdP integration implemented and tested
Custom authentication avoided (using IdP instead)
SSO configured where applicable
IdP MFA capabilities enabled
IdP threat detection features enabled (impossible travel, brute force protection)
Centralized access management through IdP

Questions to Ask: - "Are we using an enterprise IdP or custom authentication?" - "If custom, has it been reviewed by external security auditors?" - "What MFA mechanisms does our IdP support?"

Credential Security¶

Passwords hashed using bcrypt (work factor ≥12) or Argon2id
Per-user random salts generated and stored with hashes
Reversible encryption of passwords explicitly forbidden
Credentials at rest encrypted using separate encryption key
Encryption keys stored in Key Management Service (KMS), never in code
Database access restricted to authentication service only
Password complexity requirements enforced
Password history maintained (prevent reuse)

Password Hashing Requirements: - ✅ bcrypt (work factor ≥12) - ✅ Argon2id with OWASP-recommended parameters - ❌ Plain text storage - ❌ MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 without salting - ❌ Reversible encryption

Authentication Logging¶

All authentication attempts logged (success and failure)
Logs include: timestamp, username/agent ID, source IP, result, failure reason
Passwords NEVER logged (even failed attempts)
Password hashes NEVER logged
MFA tokens NEVER logged
Logs sent to centralized logging system
Failed authentication alerts configured

Layer 3: Session Management¶

Session Token Generation¶

Session tokens generated using cryptographic random generator (secrets.token_urlsafe)
Token entropy ≥256 bits
Predictable token generation patterns eliminated
UUID4 avoided (only 122 bits of randomness)
Sequential or timestamp-based tokens eliminated

Testing: - [ ] Generate 1000 tokens, verify all unique - [ ] Statistical randomness test passed - [ ] Tokens indistinguishable from true random

Session Binding¶

Sessions bound to authenticated agent identity
Sessions bound to source IP address
Sessions bound to user agent string
Sessions bound to TLS session ID (if applicable)
Session binding validation on every request
IP address changes logged (may indicate hijacking)
Agent identity mismatch causes session invalidation
User agent string changes cause session invalidation

Session Timeouts¶

Idle timeout implemented (activity-based expiration)
Idle timeout configured appropriately:
Critical agents: 5-10 minutes
High-criticality: 15-30 minutes
Standard: 30-60 minutes
Absolute timeout implemented (maximum session lifetime)
Absolute timeout configured appropriately:
Critical agents: 4-8 hours
High-criticality: 12 hours
Standard: 24 hours
Timer reset on valid activity
Timeout values documented and justified

Session State Protection¶

Session state encrypted at rest
Encryption algorithm: AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305
Encryption key separate from session tokens
Encryption key stored in KMS
Key rotation schedule defined and automated
Session storage access restricted

Session Invalidation¶

Logout functionality properly invalidates session
Password change invalidates all sessions for that agent
MFA change invalidates all sessions for that agent
Permission changes trigger session invalidation or refresh
Emergency "kill switch" can invalidate all sessions
Session invalidation tested and verified effective

Testing Scenarios: - [ ] Agent logs out → session immediately invalid - [ ] Password reset → all existing sessions invalid - [ ] Admin revokes access → agent cannot use existing session

Layer 4: Authorization¶

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)¶

RBAC model designed and documented
Roles defined with clear responsibilities
Permissions mapped to specific operations
Agent-to-role assignments documented
Role hierarchy established (if applicable)
Default deny policy (deny unless explicitly allowed)

RBAC Documentation:

Role	Permissions	Assigned Agents	Justification
____	___________	_______________	_____________

Real-Time Authorization Checks¶

Authorization checked on EVERY request (no caching)
Current permissions queried in real-time
No reliance on session-cached permissions
Permission changes take effect immediately (no delay)
Authorization failures logged with context

Anti-Pattern to Avoid: - ❌ Checking permissions at login and caching in session - ❌ Using stale permission data from minutes/hours ago - ✅ Query current permissions for every operation

Least Privilege¶

Each agent has minimum necessary permissions
Agent permissions documented with business justification
Unused permissions removed
"Super user" or "admin" roles avoided for routine operations
Periodic permission reviews scheduled (quarterly)
Permission reduction performed during reviews

Least Privilege Checklist per Agent: - [ ] Business function documented - [ ] Required operations listed - [ ] Permissions granted match required operations - [ ] No extra permissions granted "just in case"

Authorization Monitoring¶

All authorization failures logged
Logs include: agent ID, denied operation, resource, timestamp, session ID
Alerts configured for repeated failures (same agent, same operation)
Alerts configured for critical operation denials
Pattern detection for privilege escalation attempts
Dashboard showing authorization failure trends

Layer 5: Message Integrity¶

HMAC Signature Implementation¶

Every message includes HMAC signature
Signature computed over entire message payload
HMAC algorithm: HMAC-SHA256 or stronger
Signature field excluded from signature computation
Signature verification before message processing
Messages with invalid signatures rejected immediately

Constant-Time Verification¶

Signature verification uses constant-time comparison
hmac.compare_digest() or equivalent used
String equality (==) avoided for signature comparison
Timing attack protection verified

Key Management¶

Signing keys stored in Key Management Service (KMS)
Keys never stored in code, configuration, or version control
Key access authenticated and authorized
Key access logged and audited
Keys scoped to specific communication paths
Different keys for different agent pairs (where appropriate)

Key Rotation¶

Key rotation schedule defined (90 days recommended)
Automated key rotation implemented
Transition period allows both old and new keys (24-48 hours)
Emergency rotation process documented
Key rotation events logged
Agents can handle key rotation without downtime

Signature Failure Handling¶

All signature verification failures logged
Logs include: timestamp, source agent, message type, failed signature
Alerts configured for any signature failure
Investigation process defined for signature failures
Potential attack scenarios documented

Layer 6: Replay Protection¶

Nonce Implementation¶

Every message includes unique nonce
Nonces generated using cryptographic random (128+ bits recommended)
Nonces included in signature computation
Nonce uniqueness enforced

Nonce Validation¶

Nonce cache implemented to detect duplicates
Nonce cache shared across all instances (Redis, Memcached, etc.)
Cache duration matches message validity window
Duplicate nonces rejected immediately
Nonce cache cleanup prevents unbounded growth
Cache failures handled gracefully (fail secure)

Timestamp Validation¶

Every message includes timestamp
Timestamp format: Unix epoch or ISO 8601
Timestamp included in signature computation
Acceptable time window defined and configured:
Critical operations: 1-2 minutes
Standard operations: 5 minutes
Background operations: 10 minutes
Messages outside time window rejected
Future timestamps (clock skew) handled appropriately

Time Synchronization¶

All agents configured to use NTP
Reliable NTP servers configured
Clock drift monitoring enabled
Alerts configured for excessive clock drift (>1 second)
NTP synchronization status verified

Testing:

# Check NTP sync status
ntpq -p
ntpstat

Replay Attack Logging¶

All replay attempts logged
Duplicate nonce detection logged
Timestamp window violations logged
Alerts configured for replay attack detection
Investigation process for replay attempts defined

Layer 7: Rate Limiting¶

Authentication Rate Limiting¶

Failed login attempts rate-limited
Limit: 5 attempts per 5 minutes per username (recommended)
Successful logins rate-limited (prevent credential stuffing)
Rate limiting applied per IP address
Rate limiting applied per username
Both limits must pass for request to proceed

Endpoint Rate Limiting¶

Rate limits defined for all API endpoints
Limits based on endpoint sensitivity and cost
Critical operations: Tighter limits (5-10 per minute)
Standard operations: Moderate limits (50-100 per minute)
Low-cost operations: Higher limits (500-1000 per minute)
Rate limiting applied per agent identity
Rate limiting applied per IP address

Rate Limit Tiers:

Endpoint Category	Example Operations	Rate Limit	Reasoning
Critical	Payment processing, permission changes	5-10/min	High cost/risk
Standard	Create task, update data	50-100/min	Moderate cost
Low-cost	Health check, metrics	500-1000/min	Very low cost

Rate Limiting Implementation¶

Algorithm selected: Token bucket or sliding window
Rate limiter shared across all instances (centralized)
Rate limiter failures handled gracefully (fail open vs. fail closed decision)
Rate limit headers returned to clients (X-RateLimit-Remaining, etc.)

Rate Limit Exceeded Handling¶

Clear error message returned when limit exceeded
Retry-After header included in response
Rate limit violations logged
Alerts configured for suspicious patterns:
Same agent repeatedly hitting limits
Multiple agents hitting limits (coordinated attack)
Rate limits hit on critical operations

Layer 8: Input Validation¶

Comprehensive Field Validation¶

All message fields validated before processing
Type validation: String, integer, boolean, object, array
Format validation: UUID, email, URL, date/time, IP address
Length validation: Minimum and maximum characters/elements
Range validation: Numerical bounds, enumerated values
Required field validation: Mandatory fields present
Character validation: Allowed characters, encoding

Validation Framework per Field: - [ ] Field name: _______________ - [ ] Type: _______________ - [ ] Format: _______________ - [ ] Min length: _____ Max length: _____ - [ ] Min value: _____ Max value: _____ - [ ] Required: Yes/No - [ ] Allowed values: _______________

Allowlist-Based Validation¶

Allowlists used wherever possible (preferred over denylists)
Enumerated values validated against allowlist
File extensions validated against allowlist
Content types validated against allowlist
Operation names validated against allowlist

Allowlist vs. Denylist: - ✅ Allowlist: Default deny, only permitted values allowed - ❌ Denylist: Default allow, try to block bad values (always incomplete)

Validation Documentation and Testing¶

Validation rules documented for each field
Examples of valid and invalid values provided
Validation logic unit tested
Edge cases tested (boundary values, empty strings, null, undefined)
Malicious inputs tested (injection payloads)

Error Handling¶

Validation errors do NOT expose sensitive information
Generic errors returned to client
Detailed errors logged server-side only
Error messages don't reveal system internals
No database schema, SQL queries, or stack traces in client errors

Good vs. Bad Error Messages: - ✅ "Invalid request" (to client) - ✅ "Validation failed for field 'email': invalid format" (server logs) - ❌ "User alice@example.com not found in database table users" (to client) - ❌ "SQL query failed: SELECT * FROM..." (to client)

Server-Side Validation¶

All validation performed server-side (mandatory)
Client-side validation optional (UX improvement only)
Server never trusts client-side validation
Every request validated regardless of source

Validation Failure Logging¶

All validation failures logged
Logs include: timestamp, source agent, field name, validation error, source IP
High volume of failures from same source triggers alert
Validation failures on specific field types analyzed (targeted attacks)
Correlation with other security events

Post-Implementation Phase¶

Monitoring & Logging¶

Centralized Logging¶

Security events sent to centralized logging system
Logging platform selected: Splunk, Datadog, ELK, CloudWatch, etc.
Log retention meets compliance requirements:
PCI-DSS: 1 year minimum (3 months hot)
HIPAA: 6 years minimum
SOX: 7 years for financial records
GDPR: Minimum necessary for security
Logs encrypted in transit and at rest
Log access controls implemented (who can view logs)
Log tampering prevention (append-only, cryptographic integrity)

Security Events Logging¶

Authentication events logged (success, failure, logout)
Authorization events logged (grants, denials, role changes)
Session events logged (creation, invalidation, timeout)
Security control events logged:
Signature verification failures
Replay attack detection
Rate limit violations
Input validation failures
TLS handshake failures

Log Format Standards¶

Structured logging format (JSON recommended)
Consistent timestamp format (ISO 8601 with timezone)
Standard fields included:
Timestamp
Event type/category
Severity level (INFO, WARNING, ERROR, CRITICAL)
Agent identifier
Source IP address
Session ID (if applicable)
Result (success/failure)
Contextual data

Sensitive Data Never Logged: - ❌ Passwords or password hashes - ❌ MFA tokens or secrets - ❌ Full session tokens (last 4 chars only) - ❌ Credit card numbers or PCI data - ❌ Unredacted PII

Real-Time Alerting¶

Authentication Alerts¶

Immediate alert: 5+ failed attempts in 5 minutes from same IP
Immediate alert: 3+ failed attempts for administrative accounts
Immediate alert: Failed attempts during off-hours
Immediate alert: Failed attempts from unexpected geographic locations
Daily summary: Total failed attempts across all agents

Authorization Alerts¶

Alert: Repeated authorization failures (same agent, same operation)
Alert: Authorization failures across multiple operations (probing)
Immediate alert: Authorization failure on critical operations
Dashboard: Authorization failure rate trends

Security Control Alerts¶

Immediate alert: Any signature verification failure
Immediate alert: Replay attack detected
Alert: Rate limit violations on critical endpoints
Alert: High volume input validation failures
Alert: Unusual message volume from agent

Behavioral Anomaly Detection¶

Baseline normal behavior established for each agent:
Typical message volume
Typical operations performed
Typical communication partners
Typical time of day active
Geographic source locations
Anomaly detection implemented (rule-based or ML-based)
Anomalies trigger investigation:
10x increase in message volume
Activity during unusual hours
Communication with unexpected agents
Operations outside normal scope
Geographic anomalies (unexpected country)
Anomaly alerts routed to security team

Alert Response Procedures¶

Alert severity levels defined (Tier 1, 2, 3)
Response SLAs defined per severity:
Tier 1 (Low): Email daily summary, review within 24 hours
Tier 2 (Medium): Real-time notification, review within 4 hours
Tier 3 (High): Page on-call, review within 30 minutes
On-call rotation established for Tier 3 alerts
Escalation procedures documented
Alert fatigue prevention (tuning thresholds to reduce false positives)

Testing & Validation¶

Penetration Testing¶

Annual penetration test scheduled
External security firm engaged
Penetration test scope defined:
Which agents included
Which operations can be tested
Production vs. test environment
Rules of engagement
Attack scenarios documented:
Intercept agent communications
Hijack sessions
Replay attacks
Brute force authentication
Privilege escalation
Input validation bypass
Penetration test report received
Vulnerabilities prioritized by severity
Remediation plan created
Re-testing scheduled to verify fixes

Attack Simulations¶

Quarterly attack simulation schedule established
Specific scenarios tested:
Session hijacking (capture token, use from different IP)
Replay attack (capture message, send again)
Brute force (100+ login attempts)
Privilege escalation (low-privilege agent attempts high-privilege operation)
Message tampering (modify message, send with invalid signature)
Input injection (SQL injection, command injection payloads)
Expected defense behavior documented for each scenario
Simulation results logged
Defenses verified effective
Gaps identified and remediated

Incident Response Testing¶

Incident response playbooks created
Quarterly tabletop exercises scheduled
Scenarios exercised:
Compromised agent detected
Credential leak (found on GitHub)
Mass authentication failures (brute force attack)
Ransomware/malware on agent system
Insider threat scenario
Participants include: Security, Operations, Development, Management
Exercise outcomes documented
Gaps in procedures identified
Playbooks updated based on lessons learned
Communication plans tested

Agent Compromise Scenario¶

Agent compromise response playbook documented:
Detection: How compromise is identified
Containment: Immediate actions (revoke sessions, block network)
Investigation: What did agent do while compromised?
Eradication: Remove compromised agent, patch vulnerability
Recovery: Deploy clean agent, reset credentials
Lessons Learned: Update defenses
Playbook tested quarterly
Response time objectives defined:
Detection to Containment: <15 minutes
Containment to Investigation: <1 hour
Full Recovery: <4 hours
Kill switch capability tested (emergency session revocation)

Documentation¶

Security Architecture Documentation¶

High-level architecture diagram created and maintained
All agents and communication flows documented
Trust boundaries clearly marked
Security controls mapped to architecture
Configuration details documented:
TLS version and cipher suites
IdP integration details
Session timeout values
Rate limit thresholds
Key rotation schedules
Documentation version controlled
Quarterly documentation review scheduled
Documentation updated immediately after major changes

Threat Model Maintenance¶

Security Runbooks¶

Incident response runbooks created for:
Suspected compromised agent
Authentication brute force attack
Session hijacking detected
Replay attack in progress
Input validation exploit attempt
Mass authorization failures
Runbooks include:
Clear trigger conditions
Step-by-step procedures
Commands to execute (copy-paste ready)
Decision trees for variations
Escalation paths
Post-incident procedures
Runbooks tested during tabletop exercises
Runbooks accessible to on-call team
Runbooks updated based on real incidents

Developer Security Guidelines¶

Secure coding practices documented
Agent integration checklist published
Common vulnerabilities guide created (what to avoid)
Security review process documented
Example code provided (secure patterns)
Required reading for new developers
Referenced in code review guidelines
Updated based on lessons learned from incidents

Ongoing Operations¶

Quarterly Reviews¶

Security Posture Review¶

All 8 layers verified still functioning
Configuration drift checked and corrected
Security controls effectiveness assessed
Threat model reviewed and updated
New attack vectors considered
Compliance requirements re-validated

Permission Review¶

All agent permissions reviewed
Unused permissions removed
Permission grants still justified
Role assignments still appropriate
Least privilege principle maintained

Monitoring Review¶

Alert thresholds reviewed (reduce false positives)
Log volume analyzed (storage optimization)
Anomaly detection tuned
Incident response metrics analyzed:
Mean Time to Detect (MTTD)
Mean Time to Respond (MTTR)
False positive rate
Alert coverage gaps

Annual Activities¶

Comprehensive Security Assessment¶

External penetration test conducted
Full security architecture review
Compliance audit preparation/completion
Security control testing (all 8 layers)
Disaster recovery/business continuity exercise
Documentation comprehensive review and update

Technology and Threat Landscape Review¶

New attack techniques reviewed
Security tool updates evaluated
Industry best practices reviewed
Compliance requirement changes assessed
Security roadmap for next year created

Compliance Mapping¶

PCI-DSS (Payment Card Industry)¶

Requirement 4 (Encrypt transmission): Layer 1 - TLS 1.3
Requirement 8 (Identify and authenticate): Layer 2 - MFA
Requirement 7 (Restrict access): Layer 4 - RBAC
Requirement 10 (Track and monitor): Monitoring & Logging
Requirement 11 (Test security): Penetration testing, vulnerability scanning

Article 32 (Security of processing): All 8 layers
Article 25 (Data protection by design): Pre-implementation phase
Article 33 (Breach notification): Incident response procedures
Article 5 (Data minimization): Least privilege, data classification
Article 17 (Right to erasure): Data retention and deletion procedures

HIPAA (Healthcare)¶

Access controls: Layers 2 (Authentication), 4 (Authorization)
Encryption and decryption: Layer 1 (TLS), Layer 5 (Message integrity)
Audit controls: Monitoring & Logging
Integrity controls: Layer 5 (Message integrity)
Transmission security: Layer 1 (TLS)

SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley)¶

Access controls: Layers 2, 4
Audit trails: Monitoring & Logging
Data integrity: Layer 5
Change management: Documentation, version control
IT general controls: All 8 layers

Final Pre-Deployment Checklist¶

Critical Go/No-Go Items¶

Before Production Deployment¶

Risk Acceptance (If Any Items Not Complete)¶

Specific gaps documented
Compensating controls identified
Business justification provided
Risk owner assigned
Remediation timeline committed
Executive approval obtained
Risk acceptance formally documented

Post-Deployment Verification (Within 30 Days)¶

All monitoring alerts functioning
No unexpected security events
Performance within acceptable limits
No compliance violations detected
Documentation reflects actual deployment
Team trained on incident response procedures
Quarterly review scheduled

Appendix: Quick Reference¶

When to Use This Checklist¶

New Agent Deployment: - Start with Pre-Implementation Phase - Work through Implementation Phase during development - Complete Post-Implementation before production

Existing Agent Assessment: - Use Implementation Phase as audit checklist - Identify gaps against all 8 layers - Prioritize remediation by criticality

Security Incident: - Use relevant runbook from Post-Implementation - Review Implementation Phase for potential gaps exploited - Update Threat Model based on incident

Compliance Audit: - Reference Compliance Mapping section - Verify all mapped controls implemented - Provide evidence from Monitoring & Logging

Color Coding for Tracking¶

Suggested Color Code: - 🟢 Green: Fully implemented and verified - 🟡 Yellow: Partially implemented or needs improvement - 🔴 Red: Not implemented or significant gaps - ⚪ White: Not applicable to this deployment

Prioritization Guide¶

Must-Have (Deploy Blockers): - All Layer 1-4 controls (Transport, Authentication, Session, Authorization) - Critical path monitoring and alerting - Incident response capability

Should-Have (High Priority): - All Layer 5-8 controls (Integrity, Replay, Rate Limit, Validation) - Comprehensive monitoring - Documented procedures

Nice-to-Have (Continuous Improvement): - Advanced anomaly detection - Automated response capabilities - Enhanced reporting

Document Version: 1.0
Last Updated: December 2025
Owner: Security Team
Review Frequency: Quarterly
Next Review: March 2026